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ABSTRACT
Improvements in communication technology have effectively made the world a
smaller place.
As businesses attempt to exploit these new technological
improvements to better communicate their messages to their clients, these same
improvements continue to raise new and difficult legal issues related to fair trade
practices, privacy, and freedom of speech. This article identifies current legal
developments related to advertising in the online world and analyzes the actions
taken to resolve these new and difficult legal issues within the framework of United
States federal and state law and private industry-specific self-governance.
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INTRODUCTION

Blogs and social networking websites are the new marketing frontier. As
consumers have adopted these forums and integrated them into their daily routines,
advertisers have been quick to follow.' Doing so, however, is not without risk. Not
only do social networking websites need to worry about liability for third-party
posts, 2 but advertisers in those media also need to think about liability issues unique
to them. 3 Will advertisers be responsible for comments made by their employees on
social networking sites? Will they be responsible for comments made by bloggers
that they hire to discuss their products? What about the advertiser who creates its
own profiles on social networking sites? Can it contract directly with other users?
Will it be liable for content posts other users post on its pages? And what about
social networking sites and advertisers' obligations with respect to consumers'
personal information? Many courts and regulatory bodies at the federal and state
level have begun to grapple with these issues. 4 And, as they do, answers are

• This article is for informational purposes only, and should not be used as a substitute for
legal advice, which turns on specific facts. For more information about the information discussed
herein, please contact Liisa M. Thomas, a partner in the advertising law group at Winston & Strawn
LLP. Liisa has created a unique practice focusing on interactive advertising issues, and can be
reached at lmthomas@winston.com or (312) 558-6149. Robert Newman is an associate in the
advertising law group, and can be reached at rnewman@winston.com or (312) 558-8125.
1 See e.g., Google.com, Adwords, https://adwords.google.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2009);
Knowledge@Wharton, Who Owns YoW' Finding a Balance between Online Privacy and Targeted
Advertising, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.eduiarticle.cfm?articleid=1865
(last visited Nov. 2,
2009).
2 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)
("The classic instance of inducement is by advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message
designed to stimulate others to commit violations.").
3 E.g., Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501-6506 (2006). But see
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (limiting liability for service providers based on
material posted online); Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) ("No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.").
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 6501-6506; Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that craigslist, an online classified Web
site, is not liable for discriminatory housing listings posted by third party users); Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that negligence and gross negligence claims against
the social networking Web site Myspace are barred by the Communications Decency Act and
affirming that the claims are also barred under Texas common law); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[D]espite the serious and utterly deplorable consequences
that occurred in this case, we conclude that Congress intended that service providers such as
Matchmaker be afforded immunity from suit.").
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beginning to emerge that outline for companies how to limit liability and use social
5
networking forums in a manner that limits risk.

I. LIABILITY SHIELDS FOR THIRD-PARTY POSTINGS

Many companies create interactive websites in which third parties can
communicate with each other and with the company. While this practice may allow a
company to create significant buzz around its products, it can also expose the
company to potential liability-in particular vicarious or contributory liability-when
the user infringes on the rights of third parties or otherwise violates the law.6 The
risk to sites that allow such postings is that they may be viewed as responsible for
consumers' problematic comments or content. 7 However, there are certain legal
protections available and steps that companies can take to attempt to limit their
liability for such postings. These include protections that have been viewed under
common law as shielding a company from vicarious or contributory liability, as well
as two statutory shields: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")8 and the
9
Communications Decency Act ("CDA").
These different shields apply to different types of alleged infringements or legal
violations. For example, while the DMCA will shield Internet service providers
against certain claims of copyright infringement, the DMCA will generally not assist
a company in defending a claim of trademark infringement.' 0 Similarly, the CDA can
protect a company from certain posts containing illegal content (i.e., defamation),
but, as discussed in detail below, the CDA does not apply to intellectual property
infringements."

5 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N ET AL., HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE CHILDREN'S ONLINE
PRIVACY PROTECTION RULE, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/idtheft/bus45.pdf

[hereinafter HOW TO COMPLY].
6 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37 ("[Olne who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.").
7 See id.
8 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
9 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
1017 U.S.C. § 512(a) (providing explicit protection against claims of copyright infringement).
See generallyJonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Websites and the DMCA:

A Safe-Harbor from Copyright Infringement Liability or the Perfect Storm, 6 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL.
PROP.
1
(2007),
http://www.law.northwestern.eduijournals/njtip/v6/nl/l/Darrow.pdf
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the DMCA).
1147 U.S.C. § 230(c); see also Michael D. Marin & Christopher V. Popov, Doe v. MySpace, Inc.:
Liability for Third Party Content on Social Networking Sites, 25 COMM. LAW. 3, 7 (2007)
(summarizing the four exceptions of immunity granted by the CDA).
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A. Liability for IntellectualPropertyInfringements
1. TrademarkInfringement
If a trademark owner brought suit against a company because a user infringed
the trademark owner's marks, the trademark owner would need to prove either
vicarious or contributory liability. 12 There is no specific statute or regulation
protecting a service provider (such as a company that hosts a social networking site)
from liability for vicarious or contributory trademark infringement. To prove
vicarious trademark liability in the Seventh Circuit, for example, a trademark owner
must demonstrate that the website operator had an apparent or actual partnership
with the user who posted the infringing material, that the company and the user had
the authority to bind one another in transactions with others, or that the company
and the user exercised joint control over the infringing product. 13 To establish
contributory trademark infringement, on the other hand, the trademark owner must
show that the defendant either (1) intentionally induced another to infringe on its
trademark rights, or (2) continued to supply a product to a third party it knows or
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement. 14 The word "product" in
the second prong of this test has been broadly construed to include websites and
Internet services. 15 In the context of such online services, courts have generally
focused their analysis on the extent of the control the service provider has over the
third party's means of infringement.16
When bringing suit, most trademark owners have advanced arguments under
the second theory, namely that online service providers who allow trademark
infringements on their websites are contributorily liable because they continue to
provide the Internet services to infringers with actual or constructive knowledge of
the infringing activity. 17 This argument is similar to arguments used in a line of
cases examining the liability of flea market owners for trademark infringements that
occur on their premises. In those cases, flea market owners who leased vending
12 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006); see, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54
(1982) ("[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or
if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any
harm done as a result of the deceit.").
13See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.
1992).
14 InwoodLabs., 456 U.S. at 853-54; David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co., 844 F.2d 306,
311 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing InwoodLabs., 456 U.S. at 853-54).
15 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007); Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 504-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
16 Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984; see also Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807 (indicating that
contributory liability is not found where a website operator did not have "the power to remove
infringing material from these websites or directly stop their distribution over the Internet.").
17 E.g,. Size, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 568, 572 (E.D. Va. 2003); see also
Diane Von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, No. 1:06cv1356 (JCC), 2007 WL 2688184, at *11-12 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 10, 2007) ("Contributory infringement occurs when the defendant either intentionally
induces a third party to infringe the plaintiffs mark or supplies a product to a third party with
actual or constructive knowledge that the product is being used to infringe the service mark.")
(citations omitted).
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space to trademark infringers were found liable if they continued to supply that
space after they had actual or constructive knowledge of the vendor's infringing
activities.1 8 "Willful blindness," or suspecting wrongdoing and deliberately failing to
investigate, is considered to be the equivalent of actual knowledge in the context of
contributory trademark infringement. 19
The extent to which a website would be found contributorily or vicariously liable
was recently tested in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, where the well-known jewelry retailer Tiffany and Co. brought suit
20
against eBay for counterfeit products sold on the eBay auction site by eBay users.
The Southern District of New York held that eBay was not contributorily or
vicariously liable for sales by its users, and had no affirmative obligation to take
preemptive measures such as monitoring its site for counterfeit goods. 21 Instead,
because eBay removed listings featuring counterfeit goods as soon as Tiffany notified
them that a specific seller was selling an infringing product, eBay was not liable for
either direct or contributory trademark infringement.2 2 This was the case despite the
fact that eBay had "generalized" knowledge of trademark infringement on its
website.2 3 The court analyzed the extent of control exercised by eBay over the third
party's means of infringement and concluded that "while eBay clearly possessed
general knowledge as to counterfeiting on its website, such generalized knowledge is
insufficient under the Inwood test to impose upon eBay an affirmative duty to
24
remedy the problem.
However, the court did reiterate that contributory infringement may be found
where the plaintiff can show that the defendant was "willfully blind" to the infringing
activity.25 For example, in the pending case of Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v.
Akanoc Solutions, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District of California
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss a claim of contributory infringement
because the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants
26
remained willfully blind to infringing activity on websites hosted by the defendant.
The court explained that to prove contributory trademark infringement, a plaintiff
must establish that the defendant "(1) intentionally induced the primary infringer to
infringe, or (2) continued to supply an infringing product to an infringer with
knowledge that the infringer is mislabeling the particular product supplied."2 7 In
18 Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1145, 1150; see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1996) ("HardRock Cafe's application of the Inwood test is sound; a swap
meet can not disregard its vendors' blatant trademark infringements with impugnity.").
19HardRock Cafe,955 F.2d at 1149.
20 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
21Id.at 527 ("[J]t is the trademark owner's burden to police its mark, and companies like eBay
cannot be held liable for trademark infringement based solely on their generalized knowledge that
trademark infringement might be occurring on their websites.").
22Id. at 517-18.
23Id. at 507, 511.
24 Id. at 508.
25 Id. at 513; e.g., R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 619 F. Supp. 2d 39, 84-85 (S.D.N.Y 2009)
("[Plaintiff] can satisfy 'the "reason to know" standard... by showing that the [Richemont
Defendants were] willfully blind to the infringing activity."' (quoting Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 513)
(second alteration in original)).
26 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
27 Id. at 1111.
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order satisfy the second prong of this test, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
had knowledge and direct control and monitoring of the service used to infringe the
28
plaintiffs mark.

2. CopyrightInfringement
The DMCA safe harbor provides for specific relief from copyright infringement
damage claims for service providers, if the service provider follows certain specific
requirements.2 9 Specifically, the DMCA limits a service provider's liability "for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
'
service provider. "30
In order to obtain protection under the DMCA, the service provider must first
meet these thresholds: it must have either no actual knowledge of the infringement
or no knowledge of facts from which it could derive such actual knowledge; 31 it cannot
receive a direct benefit from the infringement in an instance where it has the right
and ability to control the content; 32 and as soon as it receives proper notification from
a copyright holder of an alleged infringement, it must act "expeditiously" to remove
access on its site to the infringing material. 33 In addition, the service provider must
register a designated agent with the copyright office, and place a notice on its site
that contains the agent's name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail
34
address.
Proper notification from the copyright holder of an alleged infringement must
include the following six elements:
(1) physical or electronic signature of the
copyright holder or someone acting on its behalf; (2) identification of the copyrighted
work allegedly infringed; (3) identification of the infringing material; (4) contact
information sufficient for the service provider to contact the complaining party, such
as address, telephone number, or electronic mail address; (5) a statement from the
copyright holder that it has a good-faith belief that the use of the allegedly infringing
material has not been authorized; and (6)a statement that the information in the
notice is accurate. 35 In order to streamline the receipt of notification, it may be
easiest to require that copyright holders or their agents complete a standardized
form. If the service provider receives a notification that does not substantially
comply with these six elements, it will not be deemed to have "actual knowledge" of
the claim. 36 However, if it receives a notice that does not have a signature or

28 Id.
29 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); Corbis Corp. v Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp 2d 1090, 1098 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
30 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1); Jo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145-46

(N.D. Cal. 2008).
3117 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
32 Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
33Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
34Id.§ 512(c)(2).
35Id.§ 512(c)(3)(A).
36 Id.

§ 512(c)(3)(B)(i).
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statements that the notice has been sent in good faith and is accurate, the service
87
provider must assist the copyright holder in complying with these provisions.
Upon receipt of a proper notification, the service provider must expeditiously
38
remove the material from its site, or remove access to the material from its site. It
must then promptly notify the user who has posted the allegedly infringing material
that the material has been removed. 39 The user may then send the service provider a
counter-notification, which must meet the following four requirements: (1) it must be
a written communication (i.e., a phone call to the service provider will not suffice); (2)
it must include a physical or electronic signature; (3) it must identify the material in
question; (4) it must include a statement that, under penalty of perjury, the material
was removed either because of a mistake, or because it was misidentified; and (5) it
must include the user's name, address, telephone number, and a statement that the
user consents to jurisdiction in the federal district court where the service provider is
located. 40 If the service provider receives a counter-notification, it must forward a
copy to the copyright holder, and notify the copyright holder that it intends to re-post
the material if the copyright holder does not respond in ten business days. 41 If the
copyright holder responds that it has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain
the user's infringing activity, the service provider does not have to re-post the
material. 42 However, if no such response is received, the service provider must repost the material within four days (i.e., between the tenth and the fourteenth day
after it has sent a copy of the counter-notification to the copyright holder).43
Even if a service provider has complied with these procedures, a service provider
will lose the protection of the DMCA safe harbor where it (a) "has the right and
ability to control [the infringing] activity" and (b) "receive[s] a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity."44 Importantly, both elements must be
met in order for the safe harbor to be denied. 45 These requirements codify many of
46
the common law principles discussed above.
While the DMCA would appear to provide protection to any website operator
that follows the procedures described above, Viacom nevertheless recently filed suit
against YouTube, operator of the well-known website that allows users to upload
video content. 47 Viacom is arguing, in this still-pending case, that YouTube should
not be afforded DMCA protection because YouTube knows, or should know, that its
website contains infringing materials inasmuch as YouTube has the right and ability
to control the content on the site, and receives a direct financial benefit from the
37Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
38

Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).

39Id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
40 Id. § 512(g)(3).
41Id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
42Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
43 Id.
44Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
45Id., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
46 Veoh Networks, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 ("These requirements grew out of the common law
standard for vicarious liability, and the Ninth Circuit has indicated that these elements under the
DMCA are to be interpreted consistently with common law." (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,
488 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007))).
47
Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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content. 48 This case is still pending before the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, and its outcome may alter the analysis outlined above.
However, a recent California District Court case may provide some guidance. In
Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., the court found that Veoh Networks, a
company that provides a video-sharing service similar to YouTube, was not liable for
copyright infringement for material uploaded to its website because Veoh Networks
complied with the takedown and other procedural provisions described in the
DMCA. 49 The court held that even though infringing material was posted to the
website, Veoh qualified for "safe harbor" under the DMCA.50 The court reached this
conclusion in part because it found that all video files are uploaded to Veoh through
an automated process that is initiated entirely by users. 51 In addition, the court
found that Veoh has a strong DMCA policy in place and takes "active steps to limit
incidents of infringement on its website." 52 Consequently, Veoh was found to qualify
53
for the DMCA safe harbors and prevailed on its motion for summary judgment.

B. Liability for IllegalPostings
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 199654 ("CDA") has been
interpreted by courts to protect blogs and social networking websites when
defamatory, obscene, pornographic, or other offensive or illegal material is posted on
such site by a third party. 55 Specifically, section (c)(1) of the CDA provides that "[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another content provider."56 The CDA
defines "interactive computer service" as "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet." 57 The Act also defines "information content provider" as "any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
58
service."
A company sued for the content posted by its website users should enjoy
immunity under the CDA if: (1) it is a provider or user of an interactive computer
service; (2) it did not act as an information content provider with respect to the
information that was posted; and (3) the asserted claims treat the defendant as a
48

See id.

49 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
50 Id. at 1154.

51 Id. at 1148 ("Veoh does not itself actively participate or supervise the uploading of files. Nor
does it preview or select the files before the upload is completed. Instead, video files are uploaded
through an automated process which is initiated entirely at the volition of Veoh's users.").
52 Id. at 1155.
53 Id.
54 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
55 E.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847-48 (W.D. Tex. 2007), affd, 528 F.3d 413
(5th Cir. 2008).
56 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
57 Id. § 230(f)(2).
58

Id. § 230(0(3).
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publisher or speaker of information originating from a third party. 59 Courts
traditionally treat "§ 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a relatively
expansive view of 'interactive computer service' and a relatively restrictive definition
of 'information content provider."' 60 For example, Amazon.com has been found to be
the provider of an "interactive computer service" because it enables users to post
comments about books, and was thus shielded under the CDA.61 Likewise,
Matchmaker.com-a website dating service permitting members of the service to
search a database of profiles posted by other members-was found to be the provider
of an interactive computer service because it enabled thousands of its members to
62
access and use a searchable database maintained on its computer servers.

1. When the CDA Protectsa Website
The CDA "creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service."6 3 This immunity has been broadly construed by the courts. 64 The types of
claims for which CDA has been used as a shield are numerous and diverse. For
example, Craigslist.com used the CDA when it was sued for failure to screen for the
sale of a handgun on its site which was later used in the commission of an assault
against the plaintiff.6 5 Craigslist.com also used the CDA in the Seventh Circuit as a
59 See MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL
833595, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004).
60 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).
61Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
62Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065-66 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd on other
grounds, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
63 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Carafano,339 F.3d
at 1125 (applying CDA immunity to defendant "even assuming Matchmaker could be considered an
interactive content provider"); United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
that service providers are "merely conduits" for information); Ati. Recording Corp. v. Project
Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 700-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding Defendant was not an
"information content provider" under the CDA because defendant neither created nor developed the
relevant information on the website); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293
(D.N.H. 2008) (applying CDA immunity where defendant neither created nor developed the relevant
content); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (D. Ariz. 2008)
("[T]he CDA is a complete bar to a suit against a website operator for its 'exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions ...
' (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330)); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555 (E.D. Va. 2008) (applying CDA immunity where
"Defendant was merely a[n] interactive computer service"); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,
52 (D.D.C. 1998) (indicating that service providers are unlike other information providers because
they provide an interactive medium, and thus Congress provided special immunity for providers
that police their content); Doe v. America Online, 718 So. 2d 385, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that America Online could not be found liable as a distributor for obscene material posted
on the Internet); Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 WL 816779, *4 (N.D. II. June 22, 2000)
("[The CDA] creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service." (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at
330)).
64 See, e.g., Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735(RMB), 2009 WL 1704355, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) ("Courts across the country have repeatedly held that the CDA's grant of
immunity should be construed broadly." (quoting At]. Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 699)).
65 Jd
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shield against liability arising under the Fair Housing Act, 66 MySpace has used the
CDA as a defense against liability for personal injuries stemming from content
posted to its site (where a young girl was victimized by an online predator),67 and
Yahoo! has used the CDA as a shield against claims for negligence, infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy where parents brought
suit against the company for allowing a user to host an illegal child pornography egroup.68
Google, too, has used the CDA to its advantage. 69 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of California recently dismissed a lawsuit brought
against Google based on fraudulent advertisements appearing in its AdWords
program. 70 In reaching its decision, the court found that the fact that Google elicits
the posted content for profit does not undermine Google's immunity under the CDA.71
In seeking protection under the CDA, companies typically take some affirmative
steps, although none are technically required. For example, companies post rules
clearly stating that postings that violate third-party rights are not allowed, that they
have the right to delete any posting which violates its stated rules, and that they
have the right to deactivate a registered user who violates the rules. 72 Users should
be required to read and accept the rules before posting content, and the rules should
be easy to find on the website after the user has initially accepted them. 73
Companies will also need to analyze the extent to which they are viewed merely as a
passive publisher of the information, or where they may be viewed as more actively
involved in the creation of the information. Where a company is an active creator, it
74
is unlikely to be afforded CDA immunity.
66See Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
669, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
67 See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849-50 (W.D. Tex. 2007), afTd, 528 F.3d 413

(5th Cir. 2008).
68See Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *3-5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27,
2006).

69See Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT), 2008 WL 5245490, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 17, 2008) (granting Google's motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to allege that Google was
the "information
content provider" for the relevant content).
70
Id
71 Id. at *3 ("[T]he fact that a website elicits online content for profit is immaterial; the only
relevant inquiry is whether the interactive service provider 'creates' or 'develops' that content."
(citing Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998))).
72E.g., Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,
terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).

5, http://www.facebook.com/

1. You will not post content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or
violates someone else's rights or otherwise violates the law.
2. We can remove any content or information you post on Facebook if we believe
that it violates this Statement. ...
5. If you repeatedly infringe other people's intellectual property rights, we will
disable your account when appropriate.
Id.
73 See id.
74See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (offering immunity only when the information content
provider is not the service provider itself); id. § 230(0(3) (defining information content provider as
"any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service"); Goddard,
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2. When the CDA Will Not Afford Protection
The owner of a social networking website can be both a service provider,
protected by the CDA, and a content provider, not protected by the CDA. 75 Simply
put, it the website operator creates, or is responsible, in whole or in part, for creating
or developing the content, the website is also a content provider.76 Where a company
is an active creator or developer of content, in whole or in part, it is unlikely to be
afforded CDA immunity. 77 For example, in FairHousing Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered a case brought by a fair housing council against an online
78
roommate matching website for violation of the Fair Housing Act and state laws.
The court held that when Roommates.com asked questions that members were
required to answer in order to create member profiles and organized that information
based on the member's answers, Roommates.com was not protected by the CDA
79
because it was serving as an "information content provider."
The court reasoned that because the CDA defines a content provider as "any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet," if Roommates.com is
partially responsible for the creation or development of information, it is considered a
content provider and is not entitled to CDA immunity.8 0 However, the court found
that Roommates.com was not an information content provider where it merely
requested "additional information" and left a blank text box in which end users could
enter information.8 1 This case was reheard by the Ninth Circuit en bane, and the
court concluded that "[b]y requiring subscribers to provide the information as a
condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated
answers, Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information
82
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that information."
Merely asking questions of visitors to social networking sites, however, is
unlikely to result in the website being considered a content provider. For example, in
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas distinguished the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roommates.com, LLC, on the
grounds that because users of MySpace.com are not required to provide any
additional information in their profiles, the fact that MySpace asks certain questions
83
does not convert MySpace into a content provider.

2008 WL 5245490, at *3 ("[Wihere a third party 'creates' the allegedly unlawful content, an
interactive computer service provider may be liable for its publication if it 'helps to develop [the]
unlawful content,' meaning that it 'contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct."'
(quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (alteration in original))).
75 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162.
76 Id.
77See id. at 1168; Goddard,2008 WL 5245490, at *3.

78489 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'den bane, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
79 Id. at 926.
80Id. at 925 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006)).
81Id. at 929.
82Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166.
83 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
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CDA immunity has also been found not to apply where the website actively and
specifically encourages development of illegal content. For example, in FTC v.
Accusearch Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered
a case in which the website commissioned third-party researchers to provide personal
information about individuals following the request of a customer.8 4 The court held
that the word "responsible" in the definition of "content provider" in the CDA
necessarily meant that Accusearch Inc. was a "content provider" because it solicited
requests for the information and then paid researchers to obtain it.85
Courts have in general interpreted the CDA not to grant immunity from liability
for claims that allege violations of traditional intellectual property rights, such as
claims for trademark or copyright infringement, inasmuch as the Act specifically
86
states that it does not "limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property."
For example, in Aimeidia v. Amazon.com, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit noted that while few federal courts "have considered the effect
of § 230(e)(2) on the CDA's grant of immunity," federal district courts "have held that
§ 230(e)(2) unambiguously precludes applying the CDA to immunize interactive
service providers from trademark claims."8 7 By its terms, the CDA does not apply to
"any law pertaining to intellectual property."8 8 Some courts have interpreted this to
apply to laws pertaining to "federal intellectual property,"8 9 while other have
disagreed, and have indicated that the CDA does not provide immunity for either
federal or state intellectual property claims. 90 While the CDA is normally viewed as
protecting a company against illegal postings by third parties, it is not clear that
immunity exists for claims of false advertising. 91
Similarly, the CDA is unlikely to provide protection for a company against
claims of breach of contract or promissory estoppel. For example, in Barnes v. Yahoo!
Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that while the CDA bars tort claims based on a site's
failure to remove illegal content posted by a third party, a defendant who has
promised to remove such content and fails to do so may be found liable for breach of
92
contract.

84
85

86
87

570 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1199.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006).

456 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp.
2d 446, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (declining to find that plaintiffs claim sounded in trademark and that
immunity was thus not available to defendants).
88 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
89 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBIll LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In the absence of a
definition from Congress, we construe the term 'intellectual property' to mean 'federal intellectual
property."').
90 See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008)).
91 Compare Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119, 1119 n.5 (concluding that state intellectual property
claims are eligible for CDA immunity because "[als a practical matter, inclusion of rights protected
by state law within the 'intellectual property' exemption would fatally undermine the broad grant of
immunity provided by the CDA."), with At. Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 704 ("I conclude, as
a matter of law, that Section 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity for either federal or state
intellectual property claims." (citing Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 302)).
92

570 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
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II. LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEE/AGENT POSTS
The protections discussed above do not apply to content posted by the company,
its own employees, or third-party contractors that the company has engaged to post
content, nor to other content that the company is viewed as taking part in creating. 93
Companies are thus understandably concerned about the extent of their liability for
such statements, and steps they can take to limit liability. Case law in this area is
still developing, and there are not yet clear answers regarding a company's liability
for such activities.
As an initial matter, companies must keep in mind that the material they post
(or engage others to post) on their websites, on Twitter and Facebook, or the videos
they upload to YouTube, will be considered advertising. 94 As such, the posts and
materials must comply with all applicable laws and express and implied claims must
be truthful and accurate. 95 All of these activities, and others, might result in
potential risk for a company whose employers, agents, or other third parties are
engaging in online communications on its behalf.96 For example, someone who
believes he/she has been injured by an individual's claims might bring suit against
97
the employer, rather than (or in addition to) the employee.
Even in the absence of extensive or clear case law or statutory direction, there is
some precedent and direction for companies to consider for managing risks such as
the need to disclose company affiliation, corporate liability if an employee or agent
engages in illegal activity, and liability if the individual discloses confidential
information or information that might influence the investors of a publicly traded
company. 98 In general terms, companies should attempt to limit their exposure by
ensuring that they are not acting secretly in their social media activities. For
example, companies should disclose their connections to a poster when the company
hired the person giving an opinion, the company provided a free product to the

93 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by anotherinformation content provider.")
(emphasis added).
94 See, e.g., In re Cardo Systems, National Advertising Division Case No. 4934 (2008).
95 See, e.g., id

96 See David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Whole Foods CEO Hid on Message Board,
SMARTMONEY, July 12, 2007, http://www.smartmoney.com/breakingnews/smw/?story=20070712105
705 (describing how John Mackey, the CEO of Whole Foods Market, became an example of an
employee whose personal posts affected his company). In an FTC investigation of the merger
between Whole Foods and its competitor Wild Oats Market, the FTC discovered that Mackey had
been posting on Yahoo!'s stock market forum for years, making disparaging remarks about Wild
Oats Market. Id. Mackey commented that the posts were never intended to be identified with him,
and were simply made for entertainment purposes. Id. While Mackey's posts did not result
ultimately in legal liability for his company, his argument that the posts should not be associated
with his company were widely dismissed by commenters. See, e.g., Margo Reder, CEO Postings Leveraging the Internet'q Communications Potential While Managing the Message to Maintain
Corporate Governance Interests in Information Security, Reputation, and Compliance, 7 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 179, 187-89 (2009) (describing Mr. Mackey's duties as an agent of Whole Foods).
97 See, e.g., Complaint at 5 16, Ward v. Cisco, No. 4:08-cv-04022-JLH (W.D. Ark. Mar. 13,
2008) (alleging the company knew and encouraged posting of the employee's statements).
98 See, e.g., AM. BAR FOUND., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.56(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2002)
(preventing indemnification of a corporate officer for only "an intentionalviolation of criminal law"
(emphasis added)).
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person giving an opinion, the company is otherwise compensating the person giving
the opinion with premiums such as free points or sweepstakes entries, the company
is asking its employees to "tell their friends" or otherwise take action, or employees
are acting in furtherance of the company's business and within the scope of their
employment. Creating internal policies that take into account the practical realities
of social networking tools may help limit a company's risk.

A. Liabilityfor Failingto Disclose Employee Affiliation
Under Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") guidance, employees or other
individuals who make statements in support of their companies (or companies with
whom they have an affiliation and have been asked to engage in blogging) on thirdparty blogs will need to disclose their affiliation with their companies. The FTC
enforces this guidance under its authority through the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(section 5 of the FTC Act),99 which prohibits companies from engaging in any practice
that is "deceptive" or "unfair."'100 It is not always clear what the FTC will consider a
deceptive or unfair practice, and for this reason, the FTC has promulgated several
guidelines to give companies direction about what acts the FTC will pursue. One
such guideline is the recently updated FTC Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising ("Endorsement Guides"). 1° 1 The
Endorsement Guides were last updated in 1980 and the revised version of the
Endorsement Guides went into effect on December 1, 2009.102
Under the
Endorsement Guides, a person making a statement promoting the products or
services of a company must-if there is a "material connection between the endorser
and the seller of the advertised product" which might "affect the weight or credibility
of the endorsement"-fully disclose that connection. 10 3 Because knowledge by
readers of the posting about the person's employment would likely impact how they
04
viewed that posting, the relationship, according to the FTC, must be disclosed.
This disclosure requirement holds true whether the employee posts to his or her own
105
page, or posts to the site of a third party.
In the online world, this would mean that if someone is posting about a
company's products and those posts appear to encourage others to purchase the
company's products-for example by touting the products' benefits-and there is a
material connection between the individual and the company, then the individual
needs to disclose his connection to the company. Indeed, in the recently adopted
amended Endorsement Guides, the FTC provides as an example a situation where an
employee posts a message on a third-party message board, which message promotes
99 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). Civil penalties for violations are set on a case-by-case basis by
the FTC, and range anywhere from a few thousand dollars to millions of dollars, depending in part
on the severity of the violation and the financial resources of the company. See id. § 45(1).
100Id. § 45(a)(1).
101Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. pt. 255
(2009).
102Id.
103

Id. § 255.5.

104

See id.
See id.

105
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the employer's product or services. 0 6 According to the FTC, the relationship must be
disclosed.107
For purposes of the FTC Endorsement Guidelines, the issue to examine is
whether the postings appear to be comments that encourage the purchase of the
company's products or services. Internal policies can thus be helpful in outlining to
employees or other individuals who have been asked to post on the company's behalf,
when and how they should discuss the company or its products or services in online
forums.

B. Statements Made by Individuals Who Disclose Their Relationstip
If employees or others acting for or on behalf of the company disclose their
affiliation with their company for purposes of the FTC Endorsement Guidelines,
there is a strong risk that statements they make will be considered as coming from or
being made on behalf of the company. For example, if an employee or agent of the
company discloses on a retailer's website that a food product is healthy and tastes
delicious, and discloses that he or she has been hired by the company to discuss his
or her experience with the product, consumers will likely believe that the individual's
statements are sponsored or endorsed by the company. If the statement is false or
unsubstantiated, the company could be at risk for false advertising liability. 108 With
respect to employees, whether or not the statements made by the employee-who
clearly discloses his or her relationship to the company, or whose relationship is
otherwise generally well known-is attributed to his or her employer is governed by
10 9
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior.
The requirements for establishing a claim vary from state to state, but in
general an employee is found to be acting in the scope of his or her employment if the
act is: (1) within the employee's general authority; (2) in furtherance of the
employer's business; and (3) in furtherance of the objective for which the employee
was employed. 110 For example, in Texam Oil Corp. v. D.D. Poynor, the court refused
to dismiss an action against a company whose employee made allegedly slanderous
remarks.1 11 The court found persuasive the fact that the slanderous remarks at issue
112
were made by the then-director of the corporation while discussing business.
Because the statements were made while he was discussing business, they were
3
clearly, according to the court, made within the employee's scope of employment.11
In another case, a radio host's employer was held liable for the defamatory

106

Id.

107 Id.

at 72,394.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), 52 (2006).
109 See, e.g., State by Sannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W. 2d 152, 153, 155 (Minn. 1978).
110See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 1997) (articulating the Texas
standard for respondeatsuperior); see also McPherson v. Red Robin Int'l, Inc., No. 8:04CV51, 2005
WL 2671033, at *6 (D. Neb. Oct. 19, 2005) (articulating the Nebraska standard for respondeat
superioi).
111436 S.W.2d 129, 129-30 (Tex. 1968) (per curiam).
108

112 Id.
113

Id.

at 129.
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statements made by one of its radio personalities during the radio host's show. 114
That an employee makes a statement on an online blog site, even a non-employer
site, is not likely to change the respondeatsuperioranalysis. An employer may still
potentially be liable for claims arising from such statements if the employee's
statements are viewed to be within his or her scope of employment-for example if he
or she is discussing products of the company, work he or she does at the company, or
is making an analysis that falls within the scope of the expertise for which he or she
115
is employed by the company.

C. Statements Made by Individuals Who Do Not Disclose Their Relationsh'p
Even if an individual does not disclose his or her affiliation with the company,
for example, if the person is not endorsing or promoting the company or its products
or services or is blogging anonymously, there are still risks to the company, especially
if the person is an employee or otherwise engaged to blog by the company, and is
commenting on the products or services of third parties. 116 Statements might
include, for example, a representation that a celebrity uses a particular product, or
that the products of another company are inferior. Even if the person is not acting
117
with the company's express authorization, it is possible the company may be liable.
The recently revised Endorsement Guides have clarified that advertisers and
manufacturers as well as endorsers are subject to liability for false or
unsubstantiated statements made through endorsements by endorsers. 118 The
Endorsement Guides provide that if there is a material connection between the
endorser and the seller of the advertised product which might affect the weight or
credibility of the endorsement, such connection must be fully disclosed. 119 The
Endorsement Guides provide several examples of situations which would require
disclosure of material connections in various contexts. 120 In one example, a well
known blogger blogs about a company's product on his own blog site after receiving a
free trial of the product from the company. 121 In such case, the FTC indicated that
the blogger should clearly and conspicuously disclose that he received the product for
free. 122 The FTC has not designated any particular format in which the disclosure of
a material connection must be made, only that such a disclosure must be "clear and
12 3
conspicuous."
In 2008, Cisco Systems was sued because of allegedly false and defamatory
114 Embrey

v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 968, 973 (Md. 1981).
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 1997).
116 See id.
117 See id. ("An employer is liable for the foreseeable intentional and malicious acts of its
employees done within the scope of employment, even if not authorized.") (citations omitted).
118 Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg.
72,374, 72,377 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255).
119 Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.5
(2009).
120 See Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R.
115

pt. 255 (2009).
121 73 Fed. Reg. 72,374, 72,395 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255).
122 Id.

123Id.
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statements made anonymously in an online blog by one of its employees. 124 The case
is currently pending, and it remains to be established whether Cisco authorized the
employee to make the allegedly infringing statements in his blog. Even if the
statements were not specifically authorized by Cisco, the plaintiff in this case is
arguing that Cisco should nevertheless be liable, as the employee made the
statements within the scope of his employment. 125 If the court accepts this
argument, and if the statements are indeed found to be infringing, then it is possible
that Cisco will have financial liability to the plaintiff for its employee's statements.
Similar problems could arise if third parties who often work with or on behalf of
the company make statements about the company or its products and services. For
example, in an offline case, several of Amway's distributors (not employees, but
individuals who often engaged in activities on Amway's behalf, such as distributing
its products) left voice messages, which included false claims about Amway's
competitor, Proctor & Gamble ("P&G") (namely, that P&G's president was associated
with the Church of Satan).126 At issue in the case, among other things, was whether
the statements, which were made by non-employees, were actually made by or on
behalf of the company such that the company could be sued for its distributors'
messages. 127 The Tenth Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence in that
case to show that the distributors were acting either at the express direction of
Amway, or with Amway's implied authorization. 128 However, to the extent that a
plaintiff is able to establish one of the following, then the company may be found
responsible for the posts of the agent: (1) the company's agent was acting under
express instructions (express actual authority); (2) the agent was committing acts
which were incidental to or necessary to realize the company's objectives (implied
actual authority); or (3) the agent led a third party to believe he or she had authority
from the employer to make such statements (apparent authority).129

D. Don'tFake It
State attorneys general and the FTC are closely monitoring blogs and social
networking websites for advertising claims and are bringing actions against
companies who engage individuals to post material that gives the false impression
that the employee is a satisfied customer. 130 For example, New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo recently brought an action against Lifestyle Lift for using its
employees to pose as satisfied customers and post reviews on a number of websites.' 3'
124Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 9, Ward v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 08-cv-04022-JLH
(W.D. Ark. June 2, 2009).
125

Id. at 10.

& Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000).
127Id. at 1278.
126 Procter
128

Id.

129 Id.

(citing Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Utah

1988)).
130 Jennifer Peltz, Phony online reviews draw FTC scrutiny, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 31,
2009, at A22, availableat 2009 WLNR 14801458.
131 Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of N.Y., Attorney Gen. Cuomo Secures Settlement
with Plastic Surgery Franchise that Flooded Internet with False Positive Reviews (July 14, 2009)

[9:500 2009]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

The company ultimately settled the complaint for $300,000.132 In June 2009, Andrew
Cuomo also reached settlement agreements with seven New York electronics
companies for, among other deceptive business practices, obtaining fake consumer
testimonials through pay-per-click based websites with content provided by the
website owners. 133 The companies were required to pay approximately $765,000 in
134
restitution.
There have also been recent administrative actions against fake blogs. For
example, on August 11, 2009, the Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation Program
("ERSP") issued an opinion following a competitor's challenge of Urban Nutrition's
website. 135 The website claimed to be an unbiased resource for consumers regarding
weight loss and diet products, but the ERSP found that Urban Nutrition owned
several of the weight loss and diet websites it was reviewing. 136 The FTC
Endorsement Guides state the following:
When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of
the advertised product which might materially affect the weight or
credibility of the endorsement ... such connection must be fully
disclosed.... [W]hen the endorser is neither represented in the
advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of the
viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and conspicuously
disclose either the payment or promise of compensation prior to and in
exchange for the endorsement .... 137
Consequently, ERSP recommended that Urban Nutrition include additional
disclosures and make several modifications in future advertising and clearly and
conspicuously disclose the nature of the relationship between Urban Nutrition and
138
the products being reviewed to consumers immediately upon visiting the site.
Failure to disclose relationships between a company and its endorsers can also
result in public relations headaches for the company. For example, in 2006, Sony
Computer Entertainment America launched an online viral advertising campaign
known as "All I Want for Christmas is a PSP."139 The website contained video and
blogs that were supposedly created by two teenagers who were lobbying their
parents, but were actually created by Sony's advertising company as part of an
(on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law), available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/mediacenter/2009/july/julyl4b_09.html.
132Id.

133 Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of N.Y., Attorney Gen. Cuomo Secures
Agreements with Seven Elecs. Cos. in N.Y. for Using Illegal Online Bus. Practices to Scam
Consumers Nationwide (June 25, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/
2009/june/june25b_09.html.
134Id.

135 UrbanNutrition,LLC No. 219 (ERSP Aug. 11, 2009), available at http://www.narcpartners.
org/ersp/list.aspx.
136

Id.

16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009).
UrbanNutrition,LLC No. 219 (ERSP Aug. 11, 2009), availableat http://www.narcpartners.
org/ersp/list.aspx.
137
138

139

Will Greenwald, Alli Want for ChristmasIs a PSP Vira-marketingCampaign, CNET, Dec.

13, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-9667870-1.html.
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advertising campaign. 140 After it was discovered that the campaign was the product
of an advertising campaign, Sony faced widespread criticism on the Internet for
4
creating the fake campaign.' '

E Liabilityfor Investor Rehance on Employee Postings
Under regulations enforced by the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), publicly traded companies must ensure that information that they discloseparticularly information that might be relied on by a potential investor in the
company-is not fraudulent. 142 The SEC has made clear that these antifraud
provisions of federal securities law apply not only to traditional communications, but
to online communications as well. 143 Of concern to companies was how to apply this
requirement not only to blogs and electronic forums hosted by the company, but also
to forums in which the company participates. 14 4 In recent guidance on this point, the
SEC stressed that "companies are responsible for statements made by the companies,
or on their behalf, on their Web sites or on third-party Web sites, and the antifraud
145
provisions of the federal securities laws reach those statements."'
The SEC also gave specific guidance with respect to employees blogging on a
third party's website. Namely, the SEC further elaborated in its guidance that
employees acting as representatives of a company cannot purport to speak in their
"individual" capacities, and thus their statements are likely to be attributed to the
company. 146 Such liability cannot be waived by asking a blog user not to make
investment decisions based on the blog's content or by disclaiming liability for any
damages that may arise from use of the blog's content. 147 For purposes of SEC
requirements, then, an employee who engages in online blogging will likely be viewed
as acting on behalf of the company, and as such, the company will want to ensure
that those statements do not expose the employer to liability for securities fraud.

III. PRIVACY OBLIGATIONS
One of the greatest benefits to companies who create and use social networking
and other online interactive marketing techniques is greater access to their
customers and information about them. However, with this opportunity to collect
significant information about customers comes some risks. For example, the CANSPAM Act 148 limits the manner in which companies can send electronic marketing

Id.
See, e.g., id.
142 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
143 See Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,864
(Aug. 7, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 241, 271).
144 Id. at 45,870.
145 Id. at 45,873.
146 Id.
140

141

147Id.
148

15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006).
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messages to their database of customers and potential customers. 149 In addition,
there are a number of laws and initiatives aimed at protecting children's privacy that
15 0
must be considered prior to engaging in interactive online marketing.

A. CAN-SPAM and Viral Marketing with Soca] Media
Laws have been enacted that impact how companies can interact with
consumers, and those laws have implications in the social networking and blogging
space.
For example, the CAN-SPAM Act, which requires companies sending
5
marketing emails to allow consumers to opt out of receiving future such emails,' '
can impact a company that is planning an advertising campaign over social media.
The law has particular relevance for companies that encourage others to send
marketing messages on its behalf. For example, if a company distributes free
products to employees, and asks the employees to send emails to friends telling them
their opinion of the product, the employer may be considered the "sender" of the
email for CAN-SPAM purposes. 15 2 Similarly, if a company asks users to send
messages that contain the company's advertising, and gives the consumer something
of value (like an extra entry
into a sweepstakes), the company will be viewed as the
"sender" of the message. 153 Consequently, the employer may have to scrub the email
addresses selected by the employee or the consumer against the company's opt-out
list, provide an electronic opt-out method in the message itself, provide the postal
address of the company
in the email, and make sure that the message is labeled an
"advertisement."' 15 4 This can be particularly difficult if the employee or consumer is
sending the message directly from his or her own email program. These issues are
compounded if the employee or consumer is sending the message through a social
networking site using an "in" mail feature such as those found on Linkedln or
Facebook.
At least two cases have held that messages sent through social networking
websites are subject to CAN-SPAM. For example, In MySpace, Inc. v. Globe.com,
Inc., MySpace, Inc. ("MySpace") filed an action against TheGlobe.com ("Globe") under
CAN-SPAM (among other claims) alleging that Globe set up numerous dummy
MySpace profiles and used the profiles to send almost 400,00 commercial e-messages
marketing Globe products to MySpace users. 155 Globe argued that CAN-SPAM did
not apply to its conduct because messages sent over MySpace's private messaging
system are not e-mail subject to CAN-SPAM because: "(1) unlike email, MySpace emessages have no real 'route' because the messages always remain within the 'walled
garden' of MySpace; (2) MySpace e-messages are not email because they do not use
simple mail transfer protocol ("SMTP"); and (3) unlike email addresses, MySpace emessage addresses have no domain part".156 The court roundly rejected Globe's
149Id.§ 7704(a).

§§ 6501-6506.

150 Id.

151Id.§ 7704(a)(3)(A).
152See id. § 7702(16); 16 C.F.R. § 316.2(m) (2009).
153See 15 U.S.C. § 7702(16); 16 C.F.R. § 316.2(m).
15415 U.S.C. § 7704(a).
155No. CV 06-3391-RGK (JCx), 2007 WL 1686966, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007).
156 Id.at *4.
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arguments and concluded that the MySpace e-messages constituted electronic mail
for purposes subject to CAN-SPAM. 157 Similarly, the court in MySpace, Inc. v.
Wallace found that messages sent through MySpace's internal messaging system
1
constituted electronic mail subject to CAN-SPAM. 58

B. SpecialPrivacy Considerationsfor Children
Companies that make products directed to children, or otherwise attractive to
children, must consider a number of issues if they will be collecting personally
identifiable information from or about children. 15 9 This is particularly true for social
networking websites, Le., sites where users can freely interact with one another,
whether they "know" the person or not. As many have concluded, when it comes to
minors, interacting with strangers, whether online or offline, is not necessarily a
160
good idea.
The largest and most well-known concern for such companies is the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA"), which regulates the online collection and
disclosure of personally identifiable information obtained from children under 13.161
In addition to COPPA, there have been a series of proposed state laws-one of which
was recently enacted-that seeks to govern how and what information companies can
collect from children. 162 These laws were proposed in the wake of concerns over the
limitations of COPPA, and its ability to protect children, particularly in the online
social networking realm. 163 Finally, any company that engages in marketing
activities towards children should be aware of the self-regulatory guidelines of the
Children's Advertising Review Unit, which include direction about how and what
164
information should be collected from children under thirteen years old.

157 Id.at

*4-5.

158498 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1300-01 (C.D.Cal. 2007).
159 See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006).
160See, e.g., Press Release, Senator John McCain, Senators McCain and Schumer Announce
New Legislation Creating First-Ever Email Registry for Sex Offenders (Dec. 7, 2006) (on file with
The John Marshall Law School), available at http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecordid=60B748CD-BC58-4833-8D5D- 15C9C3132D40
(discussing legislation that requires registered sex offenders to register their email addresses).
16115 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506.
162See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 9551-54 (2009).
163Compare, e.g., id. § 9552(1) ("It is unlawful for a person to knowingly collect or receive
health-related information or personal information for marketing purposes from a minor without
first obtaining verifiable parental consent of that minor's parent or legal guardian."), with 15
U.S.C.§ 6502(a)(1) ("It is unlawful for an operator of a website or online service directed to children,
or any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a
child...."). See also Justin Ellis, New Maine Law Spins a Tangled Web, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(ME.), Aug. 24, 2009, at Al (reporting that the intent of Maine's law is to "expand on COPPA").
164
See generally CHILDREN'S ADVER. REVIEW UNIT, SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR
CHILDREN'S ADVER. (2009) [hereinafter CARU Guidelines], available at http://www.caru.org/
guidelines/guidelines.pdf (offering guidance to assist advertisers and "promote responsible children's
advertising').
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1. COPPA-TheStartingLine
Under COPPA (and the FTC's Final Rule implementing that Act),165 companies
that operate websites that are directed to-or appealing to-children which collect
personal information from children online must first obtain verifiable parental
consent to collect such information. 166 There are some limited exceptions to this
requirement, including cases where the information is being collected in order to
obtain consent.167
There are two types of parental consent that a company can obtain-level one
and level two (commonly referred to as the "sliding scale approach").168 Level one is
consent provided by email, such as the parent sending an email stating that he or she
grants consent, plus a "more secure" mechanism such as sending a follow-up email 24
hours later confirming that the parent granted consent. 169 Level two, a more secure
mechanism of granting consent, is necessary if the child's information will be
disclosed to third parties-or if the child will be able to disclose his or her
information to third parties.1 70 Such disclosure is typical in a social networking site,
for example, where a child can send free text messages to other users (and in those
free text messages could disclose personally identifiable information). To obtain level
two consent, a company can either have a parent send in a physically signed consent
form by mail or fax, have a parent call and provide verbal consent, or give consent
"through a credit card transaction."'1 7 1 The FTC's COPPA Rule anticipates that other
mechanisms of "more secure consent" may be developed, although most companies
172
opt for signed consent forms or verbal consent.
To adhere to COPPA, companies that collect personally identifiable information
from children under age thirteen must also follow six basic requirements: (1) notify
parents prior to collecting information from their children; (2) obtain parental
consent prior to collecting personal information from children (as described above);
(3) maintain control of the child's information; (4) not condition the child's
participation on the submission of excessive information; (5) maintain the security of
personal information submitted by the child; and (6)post a privacy policy on the
homepage of the website and link to the privacy policy on every page on which
73
personal information is collected.
Since COPPA was passed, the FTC has brought actions against companies for a
variety of violations of the act, primarily stemming from the companies' failure to
obtain verifiable prior parental consent. For example, one company simply told
children on its website to "ask your parents' permission" before signing up: the FTC
argued that this did not constitute verifiable parental consent, and the parties settled

16515 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506; Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 312

(2009).

16616 C.F.R.§ 312.5(a)(1).
167Id. § 312.5(c).
168

See id. § 312.5(b)(2).

169 See id.
170

See id.

171 Id.

172 See id.

17315 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1) (2006); 16 C.F.R. § 312.3.
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with a payment by the company of $35,000 in civil penalties. 174 In a similar case,
another company instructed children under thirteen years old to have their parents
fill in an online parental consent form, but took no steps to ensure that a parent
actually saw or filled out the forms. 175 That case was settled with a payment of
176
$85,000 in civil penalties.
One option for companies is to avoid collecting personal information from
children under thirteen years old by creating an "age block," i.e., asking a user how
old he or she is, and if the answer is "under 13," not permitting the user to provide
personally identifiable information. Companies that ask age, however, will be
deemed to be on notice that a user is under thirteen years old if the user so indicates,
and will need to take steps after the information has been provided to block the user
from providing personal information. This can be done by dropping a session cookie
stopping the person from submitting information during the same browser session.
It is this second option that many social networking sites, and other sites intended
for older audiences but appealing to younger ones, have taken.
For example, in 2006, the FTC announced a settlement with Xanga.com, a social
networking site that it felt was appealing to children under age thirteen, even though
it was directed to adults. 177 According to the FTC, Xanga.com had actual knowledge
that children under thirteen years old were registering for the social networking site,
because it asked individuals to provide their birth date during the registration
process, but nevertheless failed to block children under age thirteen or obtain prior
verifiable parental consent as required by COPPA. 178 As part of the settlement,
179
Xanga.com agreed to pay a $1 million civil penalty.

2. Growing Concern over COPPA'sLimitations-States Take Action
As social networking became more popular, many began to feel that COPPA's
protections were not enough.180 Children could too easily lie about their age, gain
access to these sites, and find themselves in danger.18 1 In the wake of those fears,

174See Complaint at 3 14, United States v. Ohio Art Co., No. 3:02-CV-7203 (N.D. Ohio 2002
Apr. 22, 2002); Consent Decree, United States v. Ohio Art Co., Case No. 3:02-CV-7203 (N.D. Ohio
2002 Apr. 22, 2002).
175See Complaint at app. Ex. C, United States v. Hershey Foods Corp., No. 4:CV03-350 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 26, 2003), availableathttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/hershey/O30227herseyexhibit.pdf.
176 See Consent Decree, United States v. Hershey Foods Corp., No. 4:CV03-350 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
26, 2003).
177 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Xanga.com to Pay $1 Million for Violating Children's
Online Privacy Protection Rule (Sept. 7, 2006) (on file with the John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/xanga.shtm.
178 Complaint at 5-8, United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06-6853 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7,
2006).
179 Consent Decree & Order for Civil Penalties, Injunction, & Other Relief at 5, United States
v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06-6853 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0623073/xangaconsentdecree.pdf; see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 177.
180 See, e.g., Justin Ellis, supranote 163.
181 See, e.g., John B. Kennedy & Mary Wong, Recent Developments in U.S. Privacy Law,
Including Post-September 11, 2001, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS & ISSUES IN A SECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD,

at 11, 50 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
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forty-nine state attorneys general-with Texas as the lone state holdout-pursued
MySpace, a popular social networking site.182 In January 2008, the parties reached
an agreement regarding how the site-and its competitors-would handle online
child safety. 8 3 As part of the agreement, the parties issued a Joint Statement on
Key Principles of Social Networking Site Safety, in which MySpace agreed to
organize an industry-wide task force to study the issue of child safety on social
18 4
networking sites.
The key principles included using tools to protect children from inappropriate
content and inappropriate adult contacts, and the education of parents, children, and
teachers about online safety. 8 5 As part of the settlement with the Attorneys
General, MySpace also made modifications to its site to block users over eighteen
years old from browsing those under eighteen, prohibiting users over eighteen from
adding friends under sixteen unless the user knows the friend's last name or e-mail
address, and prohibiting users under eighteen from accessing tobacco advertisements
and those under twenty-one from accessing alcohol advertisements.1 8 6 The Texas
attorney general stated that he did not sign the agreement for fear that it would give
87
parents and children a false sense that children would be secure.
After the settlement, an Internet Safety Technical Task Force was assembled to
consider the practical limitations and difficulties that age verification presents.188 A
December 31, 2008, report produced by the Task Force did not provide many
alternate suggestions, concluding only that "[a]ge verification and identity
authentication technologies are appealing in concept but challenged in terms of
effectiveness." 8 9 The Task Force also noted that the best solution for protecting
children online consists of a combination of technical solutions, education, parental
oversight, law enforcement, and "sound" policies from social networking websites. 190
In a nod, perhaps, to the missing details of the Task Force, a number of states
have proposed laws that go beyond COPPA, hoping to better protect children under
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. G0-00W2, 2002), available at WL,
701 PLI/Pat
11.
182
MYSPACE & ATTORNEYS GEN., JOINT STATEMENT ON KEY PRINCIPALS OF SOC. NETWORKING

4-6 (2008), availahle at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/Social
Networking SitesSafety.pdf [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT]; see Anne Barnard, MySpace Agrees to
Lead Fight to Stop Sex Predators,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at B3; Brad Stone, FacebookAgrees to
Devise Tools to Protect Young Users, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2008, at C4.
183 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 182, at 1-2; Barnard, supra note 182.
184 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 182, at 1; Barnard, supra note 182; see also Brad Stone,
Despite News Reports, Task ForceFinds Online Threat to Children Overblown, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2009, at A16 ("A task force created by 49 state attorneys general to look into the problem of sexual
solicitation of children online has concluded that there really is not a significant problem.").
185 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 182, at 1-3.
186 Id. app. A.
187 Press Release, Tex. Att'y Gen., Att'y Gen.'s Fugitive Unit Arrests Sex Offender Using
MySpace; Abbott Objects to Recent Report (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with The John Marshall Review of
Intellectual Property Law).
188 See generally INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY &
SAFETY

SITES

ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES (2008), availableathttp://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/isttf (presenting
the findings of the task force).
189 Id. at app. D (stating this as the Technology Advisory Board's conclusion to its part of the
task force's study).
190

Id. at 6.
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thirteen years old in their states who provide personally identifiable information
online to sites-including social networking sites. These states include: Illinois
(would require social networking sites to get written parental permission before a
minor can create a profile page, and would require parents to be provided with
ongoing access to their children's pages);191 Georgia (would prohibit social networking
sites from allowing minors to create profiles without first obtaining parental consent,
and without giving parents ongoing access to the minor's profile);192 and New Jersey
(would require websites that collect information from children between 13 and 17 to
obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of
adolescents' information).193 and North Carolina (would have required all social
networking sites to obtain parental consent before a minor could use their sites, and
would have required procedures to confirm age and identities of parents).194 As of
this writing, only the Illinois bill, as originally proposed and described here, remains
pending.
In an interesting twist, a more restrictive version of these states' laws was
passed this summer in Maine, and as of this writing (despite emergency motions filed
against it)195 took effect on September 12, 2009.196 The Maine law brings four new
features to the table. First, it goes beyond the online world and puts restrictions on
offline interaction with minors. 197 Second, it expands the age of applicability to
eighteen years of age, up from COPPA's thirteen. 198 Third, it puts an absolute
prohibition on direct marketing to children under eighteen years old-whether
parental permission has been obtained or not. 199 The type of prohibited direct
marketing is broadly defined, and would presumably include not just email and text
messages sent to children in Maine-including those between thirteen and
seventeen, but also marketing messages sent directly to a child through social
networking websites like Facebook and Twitter. 200 This brings into question how
companies will handle existing databases that may contain information of children
less than eighteen years old who reside in Maine. Fourth, the law prohibits
collecting personal information from children in Maine under eighteen for
"marketing purposes" without first obtaining parental consent. 20 1 The definition of
"marketing purposes" is quite broad, and is not to be confused with direct marketing
191Social Networking Website Access Restriction Act, H.B. 1312, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2009).
192 A Bill to Be Entitled, S.B. 59, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007).
19
3 Adolsecents' Online Privacy Protection Act, A108, 108th Gen. Assem. (N.J. 2008).
194 Protect Children from Sexual Predators Act, S.B. 2007-132, Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007)
(enacted), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/PDF/S132v6.pdf.
As
enacted, the law only requires social network website operators to take reasonable efforts to prevent
registered sex offenders from accessing their sites. Id.
195 See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Me. Indep. Coils. Ass'n v. Baldacci, No.
CV-09-396-B-W (D. Me. Aug. 26, 2009); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Me. Indep. Colls. Ass'n v. Baldacci, No. CV-09-396-B-W (D. Me. Aug. 26,
2009).
196 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 9551-54 (2009).
197 Id. §§ 9552-53.
198 See id. (protecting "minors" from unlawful collection and use of health-related information
or personal information, and prohibiting predatory marketing against "minors").
199Id. § 9553.
200
201

See id.
See id. § 9552(1).
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to the child from whom information was collected (which, as mentioned above, is
prohibited under this law, whether or not consent has been obtained),202 Instead,
marketing covers generally the "purposes of marketing or advertising products, goods
or services to individuals."2 0 3 Thus, if a minor's personal information is collected,
analyzed, and used internally to determine how to market to individuals generally,
parental consent would arguably be necessary under the new law.
The Maine Attorney General is given authority to enforce the law, with potential
civil penalties of $10,000 to $20,000 for the first violation, and $20,000 or more for
the second or subsequent violation of the law.2 0 4 The office of the Maine Attorney
General has indicated that it will not enforce the law.2 0 5 However, the new law
provides for a private right of action, with statutory damages of up to $250 for each
violation.20 6 In an effort to discourage such private suits, the District Court of Maine,
in responding to an emergency suit filed against the law, recently found that the
plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of
their claims that the law is overbroad and violates the First Amendment.2 0 7 The
court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit upon stipulation of the parties, and warned
anyone considering bringing a private action that it would give the same analysis
20 8
(that the law is likely unconstitutional) if they decided to bring a case.
Presumably, with this ruling in place, the Maine legislature may look to repeal or
20 9
revise the law.

3. The Children'sAdvertisingReview Unit
As laws regarding information collection from minors are constantly in flux, it is
always helpful for companies to have an overarching guide they can turn to in the
hopes of avoiding not just a violation of a current law, but a violation of a law that
might not yet be in place. Given that such laws may apply retroactively to
information already collected-such as the Maine law described above-these guides
take on newfound importance. 2 10 One such guide was developed by the Children's
Advertising Review Unit ("CARU"), a self-regulatory body funded by companies that
advertise to children, or whose products are appealing to children.2 1' As part of its
self-regulatory mission, CARU publishes the CARU Self-Regulatory Guidelines
Id. §§ 9551(2), 9553.
Id. § 9551(2).
204 Id. § 9554.
205 Stipulated Order of Dismissal at 1, Me. Indep. Colls. Ass'n v. Baldacci, No. CV-09-396-B-W
(D. Me. Sept. 9, 2009).
206 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 9553 (2009).
207 Stipulated Order of Dismissal, supra note 205, at 1.
208 Id.
209 See Christopher Cousins, Law PotectingfMihrrs'Hal DataNot toBe Enftrced BANGOR DAILY
NEWS (ME.), http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/119741.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) ("Schneider
[autlor of the bill]... bope[s] that morn representatives from the afeted industries will partcpate in the procss of
revamping the law.").
21
°But see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("Retroactivity is not
favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed
to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.").
211 CARU GUIDELINES, supra note 164.
202
203
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("Guidelines"), which it has updated frequently over the years to address new
212
developments in child marketing, including online information collection.
The Guidelines touch on all aspects of marketing and advertising to children,
including interactive and online marketing campaigns, and contain guidelines on
Interactive Electronic Media. 213 Under the Guidelines, companies that collect
2 14
information from children must follow, essentially, the requirements of COPPA.
The Guidelines provide more information about how a company can take actions such
as screening for users under thirteen years old and blocking them from accessing a
company's website. 215 In addition to providing more direction about following
COPPA, CARU is also active in policing the industry for violations. For example, in
a 2007 decision, CARU announced that it was referring WUK Music Group's
daechelle.com, a fan site for the singer Daechelle, to the FTC after finding that the
site collected personal information and asked children for their ages without
obtaining verifiable parental consent. 216 Although the advertiser included the
statement, 'You must be 13 years of age or older to submit personal information,"
people who were identified as being under thirteen were not blocked from joining the
site. 217
Because the operator of the site failed to comply with CARU's
recommendation that the site implement neutral age screening and block users
under thirteen years of age from registering, CARU recommended the case to the
2
FTC. 18
Companies often work with CARU, however, obviating the need for the entity to
refer a company to the FTC for further action. For example, in August 2009, CARU
recommended to the Sandylion Sticker Designs website that it modify its information
collection practices, and the company agreed to do S0.219 In that case, if a child
indicated that he or she was under the age of thirteen, the child could circumvent the
need to fill out the parent registration form on the site by clicking the back button
and entering a date of birth that made him or her over thirteen. 220 CARU indicated
that it was concerned about the inclusion of "tip-off' language that encouraged
children to misstate their ages and the lack of a session cookie to block the attempts
221
at circumvention of the age verification process.
212 Se generaly id. (instructing companies who market towards children what the standard
for advertising to children is and how to comply with current laws).
213

Id. at 11-15.

Compare id. (discussing inappropriate advertising to children and providing guidance
regarding online privacy protection for children under the age of thirteen), with 15 U.S.C. § 6502
(2006) (protecting children under the age of thirteen from unfair and deceptive acts and practices on
the internet in connection with the collection and use of personal information), and 16 C.F.R. § 312.5
(2009) (listing the general requirements for parental consent).
215 CARU GUIDELINES, supra note 164, at 15.
216 Press Release, CARU News, CARU Refers Daechelle Fan Site to FTC for Review (Nov. 6,
2007) (On file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law), available at http://
www.caru.org/news/2007/CARU-4739PR.pdf.
217Id.
214

218

Id.

Press Release, CARU News, CARU Recommends Sandylion Modify Website to Better
Protect Children's Privacy; Company Agrees to Do So (Aug. 18, 2009) (on file with The John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law), available at http://www.caru.org/news/2009/
5048PR.pdf.
220 Id.
221 Id.
219
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CARU has also recommended modifications to websites that contain links to
third-party sites that are not compliant with CARU's guidelines. For example, in
August 2009, CARU reviewed a website owned by Kidz Bop LLC, and discovered that
222
the site included a link to a third-party mobile website operated by Gameloft.
CARU determined that Gameloft's site was not in compliance with CARU's
guidelines with respect to online privacy protection. 223 The non-compliant website
did not implement a neutral age-screening mechanism to filter children under
thirteen years old, and various areas of the site collected personally identifiable
information. 224 CARU found that Kidz Bop could reasonably expect children under
thirteen to visit their website and CARU guidelines specifically provide that
operators of websites which are for children or contain areas for children should not
225
knowingly link to other websites that do not comply with CARU guidelines.
Methods for collecting verifiable parental consent-and screening children who
are under thirteen (or eighteen, or any other age)-are not foolproof. 226 Nevertheless,
companies that collect information online from children will be found responsible if
they do not screen and/or obtain parental consent successfully, with states seeking
more and more to turn that responsibility into something resembling absolute
liability. 227 This is particularly true for entities that set up forums for third parties
to interact-like social networking sites. 228 As a result, companies should look not
only to existing laws and pending legislation for direction when creating online
information, but also stay current with self-regulatory guidance and cases.

CONCLUSION

Corporate blogs, social networking sites, and a wide array of other new media
communication tools allow companies to advertise to and directly interact with their
customers. As companies engage with consumers in these new media, however, they
need to keep in mind the legal risks that are involved, and should take steps to limit
their liability when possible. And, such limitations and steps do exist, even if this
area of the law is still developing.

222 Press Release, CARU News, CARU Recommends Kidz Bop Modify Website to Better Protect
Children's Privacy; Company Agree to Do So (June 24, 2009) (on file with The John Marshall Review
of Intellectual Property Law), availableat http://www.caru.org/news/2009/5034PR.pdf.
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Id.

See id.
CARU GUIDELINES, supra note 164, at 15.
226 See 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (9) (2006) (defining "verifiable parental consent" using the term
"reasonable").
227 Id. § 6502(a)-(c).
228 See HOW TO COMPLY, supra note 4, at 1 (defining "Who Must Comply" with COPPA and
224
225

COPPR).

